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LIFE AND AUTONOMY:
FORMS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
KANT AND HEGEL* 
Thomas Khurana 
It is, by now, a well-established thesis that one major path that 
runs from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, up to Hegel is 
defined by the conception of freedom as autonomy. It is less 
known and has been less frequently the object of study that 
from Kant to Hegel a new idea of life takes shape as well. Even 
less taken into account is the fact that these two paths from 
Kant to Hegel might be systematically intertwined. If the notion 
of life in German Idealism is discussed at all, it has been dis-
cussed mostly in dealing with the philosophies of nature and 
biology of Kant and his successors. This framing is, of course, 
not wrong in itself; yet to my mind we can only fully account 
for the thought of what is living and the new interest that the 
idealist philosophies of nature actually deserve if we regard life 
as a practical notion. For the idealists, life is, as Fichte has it, an 
“analogue of freedom in nature,”1 and it describes the one form 
of object we can encounter in nature that possesses a kind of 
unity and organization that comes close to the unity and the 
organization of spirit. In various accounts of German Idealism, 
life is not only regarded as an analogue of a self-grounded 
* Work on this paper was made possible by a generous grant of the Alexander von 
Humboldt Foundation. I would like to thank the German Philosophy Workshop at 
the University of Chicago, the New York German Idealism Workshop at the New 
School for Social Research and at Columbia University, and the Département de phi-
losophie at the Université de Montréal for the opportunity to present drafts of this 
paper. I am deeply indebted to Jim Conant, Matthias Haase, Catherine Malabou, 
Christoph Menke, Frederick Neuhouser, Robert Pippin, Sally Sedgwick, and Dirk 
Setton for their instructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 J. G. Fichte, “Eigene Meditationen zur Elementarphilosophie,” in: Gesamtausgabe: 
Nachgelassene Schriften Bd. 3: 1793–1795, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog 
1971, p. 244.
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order, but figures furthermore as a precondition of the actuality 
of freedom: It is in being alive that we might become free.2 How 
exactly this is so is of course not only a very complicated issue 
but also a contested one among Kant and his successors. In 
order to outline at least two basic approaches to relating ‘life’ 
and ‘autonomy,’ I would like to present a sketch of a reading of 
Kant, in whose works the analogy of life and autonomy first 
manifests itself, and of Hegel, who has to my mind most fully 
developed the potential of this constellation. Starting with Kant 
is inevitable, for he has provided the decisive formulation of the 
concept of autonomy (in the Groundwork and his second Cri-
tique) and has introduced a new thinking of the living (in his 
“Critique of Teleological Judgment”), both of which were in turn 
taken up and developed by his successors. In the following I 
would like to point out some of the structural analogies present 
in Kant’s thought on practical autonomy and living self-consti-
tution (I) in order to briefly address why he himself does not 
eventually draw on this analogy (II). It seems that Kant thought 
that in order to be free, we in fact have to abstract from our liv-
ing nature rather than build on the way in which it already is in 
a basic sense self-constitutive. In the second half of this paper I 
want to turn to Hegel in order to show how he deepens the inter-
connection between the living and the autonomous, life and 
spirit, without however reducing autonomy to a biological fea-
ture. While he stresses the degree to which living beings are 
2 There seem to be two fundamental points of departure for this thought in Kant: first 
the idea that in order to be or become free, a being must possess the faculty of desire 
or a will (in the broad sense): the faculty to be by means of its representations the 
cause of the reality of the objects of these representations (cf. Kant’s definition of Life 
from the Critique of Practical Reason: “Life is the faculty of a being to act in accordance 
with laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of desire is a being’s faculty to be by means 
of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations.” (KpV 
5:10)). The second point of departure is the idea that in order to be free, a being must 
be of the self-organizing and self-constituting sort that living beings are. In the fol-
lowing I will only directly deal with this second idea. It is an open question for me 
how being a self-organizing and self-constituting entity is precisely related to being 
an entity that can will something.
indeed, in a basic sense, “autonomous”, and while he indicates 
that it is from life that spirit emerges (III), he specifies the mode 
of a self-conscious life of spirit that is to be distinguished from 
the biological form of the living (IV).
I.
The peculiarity of the concept of autonomy lies in the fact that 
it articulates a concept of freedom and a notion of order in one 
and the same stroke. Whereas the conception of freedom as the 
freedom from external constraint and the idea of freedom as 
the freedom to act arbitrarily both indicate a notion that seems 
in a basic fashion to be opposed to order, the concept of auton-
omy formulates a freedom that expresses itself as an order: an 
order of laws one has given to oneself or an order of laws of 
which one can regard oneself as the author. Freedom exists, in 
Rousseau’s famous expression, as “obedience to the law one has 
prescribed to oneself” and is in this sense opposed to a “natural 
freedom” which knows no constraints at all.3 The concept of 
autonomy thus contains two connected thoughts: First, that to 
be free is to obey laws of a peculiar kind. Second, that for a law 
or an order to be fully normative, it has to be self-prescribed 
and not given externally. Freedom and normativity are, in this 
sense, correlative ideas. For an order to be normative it has to 
be rooted in freedom and for freedom to be real it has to express 
itself as a normative order.4 
Kant’s concept of autonomy can be regarded as the central 
formulation encoding this idea of an internal connection 
between liberty and order, freedom and the law. In Kant’s own 
3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in: The Social Contract and Other Later 
Political Writings, ed. and trans. V. Gourevitch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1997, p. 54.
4 Cf. Robert Brandom, “Freedom and Constraint by Norms,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 187–196.
Thomas Khurana Life and Autonomy
158 159
exposition of this kind of order, it is practical reason or the will 
that is described as autonomous. Now, the will is free in Kant’s 
description if it is subjected to a law in such a way that it can also 
be regarded as self-legislating. That is to say, it is only ‘freely’ 
and ‘normatively’ bound by laws to the degree that it can itself 
be regarded as the source of these laws: “Hence the will is not 
merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it 
must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and just because 
of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as 
the author).” (GMS 4:431) Freedom in this sense consists in a 
peculiar mode of subjection: a mode in which the entity subjected 
to the law can be simultaneously regarded as the source of the 
law. The free subjection of the will is one in which the subjec-
tion is simultaneously an expression of the will.
If we take the language of the will “giving” or “imposing” the 
law that binds it literally, the concept of autonomy can seem to 
be endangered by a paradox: If the will is bound by the law only 
under the condition that it has given the law to itself, it seems 
that the will is ultimately not bound at all: If the binding qual-
ity of the law fully derives from it being instituted by the will 
itself, what should prevent the will from, in a second act, aban-
doning the law and instituting a diﬀerent one? If we then, how-
ever, presume that the will therefore must have had reasons for 
instituting the law in the first place, it was already bound in 
instituting the law and in this sense not free in giving itself the 
law, in this sense not the “Urheber” of this law. (The actual 
Urheber seems to be the law giving the will reasons to give itself 
the law so that the will is in the last instance under a law it has 
not given to itself ).5 If the paradox would hold in the strict 
5 For the deeper structure of this paradox of autonomy see Robert Pippin, “Hegel’s 
Practical Philosophy: The Actualization of Freedom,” in: Cambridge Companion to Ger-
man Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, pp. 180–
199; Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2002; Robert Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational 
Agency as Ethical Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, ch. 3; see also the 
sense, it would be, of course, fatal to the intelligibility of the 
idea of autonomy. To argue, on the other hand, that the para-
doxical formulation rests on a simple misconstrual or misun-
derstanding of the idea of autonomy and that, in fact, the con-
ception of autonomy is a simple and unambiguous one, also 
does not seem right in that it does not account for the way in 
which Kant and his successors indeed struggled with the com-
plex conjunction of freedom and the law in the concept of 
autonomy. This struggle seems to indicate that the paradoxical 
formulation expresses a tension that is indeed vital for the idea 
of autonomy: Autonomy entails both subjection to order and 
expression of freedom; these moments are conditions for one 
other, just as they are also in tension with one another.6 
In order to trace this tension without articulating it as a 
sheer—and thus empty—paradox, it might be helpful to say 
which basic law it is that the will, on Kant’s view, is subjected 
to in being at the same time law-giving. The law through which 
the will just as much binds itself as it expresses itself is, accord-
ing to Kant, the categorical imperative: to act only according to 
that maxim that you can at the same time will as a universal 
law. The will is free in adopting this or that maxim and thereby 
taking this or that path of action, insofar as it adopts the maxim 
only on the grounds that it could legislate the maxim as a uni-
versal law. To express the thought in a diﬀerent way, we could 
say that the will is only restricted by the ability of the maxim to 
be willed to the fullest degree, which means that the will is 
restricted only by the will-ability of the maxim and thus by 
something rooted in itself. This capacity of a maxim to be 
willed to the fullest degree corresponds to the degree to which 
it can be willed as a law. The reason for this resides in the nature 
contributions in Thomas Khurana and Christoph Menke (eds.), Paradoxien der Auto-
nomie, Berlin: August Verlag 2011.
6 For further elaborations on such a dialectical conception of autonomy, see Thomas 
Khurana, “Paradoxes of Autonomy: On the Dialectics of Freedom and Normativity,” 
Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 17 (2013), pp. 50–74.
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of the rational will: a will exerts causal power, and insofar as 
causality necessarily implies laws, a lawless will seems incom-
prehensible to Kant: “ein Unding” (GMS 4:446).7 As the capac-
ity to cause a state of aﬀairs by means of a representation the 
rational will thus has to exhibit a specific form of lawfulness. 
The rational will itself is in this sense lawful; it naturally adopts 
the form of the law. This is the reason why Kant can use the 
formulation that the will is a law unto itself (“der Wille ist sich 
Gesetz”).8
I do not want to enter into an investigation of the concept of 
the will at this point and deal with the question how convinc-
ing it is to tie a will to lawfulness in this way;9 at this point I am 
rather interested in the form of the account that Kant gives for 
making plausible that something is autonomous, bound by 
something to the degree that it expresses itself in that by which 
it is bound. This can be the case, it seems, in the sense that 
something is subject to the laws that are its own, laws that derive 
from its own nature. In its adoption of maxims, the will is not 
restricted by an external influence; it is restricted only by the 
categorical imperative—the law of lawfulness—that the 
rational will by its very nature exposes as the supreme law: The 
categorical imperative orders the will to be a universal lawgiver 
which is so much in accordance with the will’s nature that it 
can regard itself to be ordered by ‘itself ’ to do so. The will, by 
7 Kant writes: “Since the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance 
with which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an eﬀect, must 
be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in accordance with 
natural laws, is not for that reason lawless but must instead be a causality in accor-
dance with immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be 
an absurdity [ein Unding].” (GMS 4:446)
8 Cf. Kant’s formulation from the Groundwork that “autonomy of the will is the 
property of the will by which it is a law to itself” (GMS 4:440; see also: GMS 4:446). 
9 In addition, I will not discuss the question of whether the notion of autonomy in 
Kant is irreducibly tied to the moral law or whether there might also be a Kantian 
concept of autonomy that is to be understood as morally neutral in order to make 
room for the possibility of a freely chosen evil. Cf. Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of 
Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990, pp. 94ﬀ.
its nature, “is” this law. By subjecting itself to it, it can thus 
‘regard’ itself as its author. The freedom of the will is not law-
less, but rather a “causality according to immutable laws of a 
special kind” (GMS 4:446): laws that are prescribed by the will 
itself, in the sense that the will is bound in this prescription 
only by its own nature, the law of lawfulness. The will is neither 
determined to act nor otherwise bound by something external 
to it, but instead is determined and bound by its own nature. In 
this sense the actions of the will are explained by laws of auton-
omy and not laws of heteronomy (laws that specify the way in 
which something is determined by something external to it). 
According to this description, being autonomous is not liter-
ally to be under laws that are self-prescribed, self-legislated or 
self-given—it means to be under laws that are one’s own. They 
are one’s own in the sense that they spring from one’s own 
nature,10 pertain to one specifically and concern the eﬀects of 
events that are relevant according to one’s nature. In order to 
make plausible what this means precisely—to be bound by 
one’s own law (to be determined “eigengesetzlich”)—commen-
tators have repeatedly alluded to the nature of laws of the liv-
ing.11 The will’s law is not “its own” because the will has given 
it to itself in a lawless act; it is rather its own because this law 
expresses its nature. The way in which the laws are the will’s own 
might thus seem parallel to the way in which the laws deter-
10 If we put it like this, the thought of autonomy clearly possesses Spinozist reso-
nances—compare Spinoza’s definition of a free thing from the Ethics: “That thing is 
said to be free [liber] which exists solely from the necessity of its own nature, and is 
determined to action by itself alone. A thing is said to be necessary [necessarius] or 
rather, constrained [coactus], if it is determined by another thing to exist and to act in 
a definite and determinate way.” (Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, in: Complete Works, trans. 
Samuel Shirley, ed. Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Pub-
lishing 2002, Part I, Def. 7, p. 217). Certainly, there is a limit to the parallel insofar as 
Spinoza holds that only God can be described as such a free cause; for only he exists 
and acts solely from the necessity of his own nature (Ibid., Part I, Proposition 17, Cor-
ollary 2, p. 228).
11 See e.g. Sebastian Rödl, Self-Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2007, ch. 4; Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, esp. ch. 2.
Thomas Khurana Life and Autonomy
162 163
mining the operations and developments of an organism are 
its own in expressing its “nature,” the specific life-form that per-
tains to it. Insofar as the living being is not determined by 
another being to exist and to act in a particular way, but rather 
by the necessity of its own nature, it can appear to be autono-
mously determined.12 Take a migrant bird, for example, and 
what it does in the spring. That the bird determines itself to fly 
back north under certain conditions in spring is an act that is 
to be understood according to the laws proper to the bird’s life-
form: in following these laws the bird acts in accordance with 
its own laws. Certainly, it is prompted to act in this way by cir-
cumstances; but these circumstances only possess significance 
due to the bird’s life-form and do not have the same eﬀect on a 
non-living mass of matter of the same size and roughly the same 
components. The circumstances that motivate the act hence are 
not purely external but eﬀective to the degree that they possess 
an internal significance for the life-form. In being moved by 
these circumstances the living being accords with its own 
nature: it is determined by its own laws to act in the way it does.
Now, if we provisionally grant that the autonomous law of 
the practical agent might be the agent’s own law in a sense that 
is formally parallel to the way in which the specific laws of a 
living being are its own, we certainly need to consider more 
12 Sebastian Rödl, who advances an interpretation of autonomy as being under one’s 
own law (instead of autonomy as “giving oneself the law”), tries to explain further in 
what sense “laws of the living” might be “laws of autonomy” (Rödl, Self-Consciousness, 
p. 118). Inanimate nature is subject to laws of heteronomy of the form “An N does A, 
if an M does B to it”; N’s act in this sense is solicited by an act of M which did not itself 
accord with a law of N but happens independently of N and its laws. Living nature 
instead is subject to laws of autonomy, that possess the form “An N does A, when (the 
time comes and) an M does B to it,” in which the “when” indicates a systematic rela-
tion between M’s act and the laws of N. Laws of a life-form “place its instances in cir-
cumstances that solicit the dispositions and powers characteristic of the life-form” 
(Ibid., p. 119). From this basic form of autonomy to be found in all living beings, Rödl 
distinguishes a stronger sense of autonomy pertaining to laws of reason: “Being under 
laws of reason, I am subject to nothing other than myself in the sense that these laws 
spring from and constitute the nature of that to which I refer first personally.” (Ibid., 
p. 120)
precisely the way in which they are. Is it really enough for 
something to realize laws that spring from its own nature—its 
specific form or essence—to be autonomous? If my computer 
turns itself oﬀ when the battery is low and it thereby follows its 
(designed) inner nature we will probably not be inclined to say 
that my computer follows an autonomous law. If there is some-
thing to using the analogy of living beings, there must be more 
involved here in speaking of the living following its “own laws.” 
I believe that Kant’s account of living beings (and the way they 
diﬀer from designed machines) can be of help in showing the 
way in which it might be indeed correct to say that living beings 
exhibit a basic form of autonomy. This occurs, however, in 
attaining a more complex account of what one can name “one’s 
own” laws: not just laws that pertain to the respective entity 
specifically, but laws of an entity that produces or constitutes 
itself. In order to explain what this could mean, we have to con-
sider briefly Kant’s account of living beings in the third Critique. 
The fact that Kant’s “Critique of Teleological Judgment” and 
the characterization of living beings contained therein might 
be relevant to the question of autonomy is very generally sug-
gested by the fact that living beings seem to require a diﬀerent 
form of judgment or explanation than is usually employed in 
order to account for eﬀects described by laws of heteronomy: 
They exhibit a type of organization “not analogous with any 
causality that we know” (KU 5:375) and if we only take recourse 
to mechanical causality, we cannot explain the specific neces-
sity of living beings, the lawfulness that these beings display. 
For if one adduces, e.g., the structure of a bird […] one says 
that given the mere nexus eﬀectivus […] this is all in the high-
est degree contingent: i.e., that nature, considered as a mere 
mechanism, could have formed itself in a thousand diﬀerent 
ways without hitting precisely upon the unity in accordance 
with such a rule, and that it is therefore only outside the con-
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cept of nature, not within it, that one could have even the 
least ground a priori for hoping to find such a principle. (KU 
5:360; emphasis added)
In order to account for the specific ‘unity in accordance with a 
rule’ of the living being—the laws that are the living’s “own” in 
a peculiar sense—we have to take recourse to the principle of 
purposiveness (which is characterized in the introduction to 
the Critique of Judgment as the mediating term (“vermittelnde 
Begriﬀ”) between conceptions of nature and the concept of free-
dom). In order to account for the way in which living entities 
expose an inner unity and necessity that on the other hand 
cannot be made sense of in terms of a merely mechanical nat-
ural necessity, the power of judgment (Urteilskraft) grasps living 
beings as if they were purposively produced.
Now, what characterizes this specific “lawful unity” that per-
tains to the living being (and moves us to impute to it a certain 
purposiveness)? Kant describes this sort of lawful unity in two 
stages:13 (1) Living beings are organized beings in the sense that 
their “parts (as far as their existence and their form are con-
cerned) are possible only through their relation to the whole” 
(KU 5:373). Their parts are suited to one another and to the 
whole in such a manner as to form a functional unity. Organ-
isms share this property with designed artifacts. In the case of 
artifacts, this is explicable however by the plan or design that 
antedates the artifact and that has governed the selection, for-
mation, or arrangement of the parts in this functional array. 
The natural being exposes a comparable inner structure—a 
comparable “lawfulness” of the inner arrangement—while we 
however are not able to point at a preceding design or a creator 
13 On the distinction between these two stages that concern two levels of living things’ 
mechanical inexplicability—that which they share with artifacts and the other which 
distinguishes them from artifacts—cf. Hannah Ginsborg, “Two Kinds of Mechanical 
Inexplicability in Kant and Aristotle,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (2004), 
pp. 33–65.
existing independently of this being. (2) Secondly, living beings 
are self-organizing beings. As I pointed out, they are not—in any 
way known to us—the eﬀect of a concept given in an under-
standing external to them (as in the analogous case, the plan 
or the purpose of the artisan); they are rather cause and eﬀect of 
themselves: they produce themselves. Its parts are “combined 
into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and eﬀect of their 
form” (KU 5:373). This self-organizing character has two conse-
quences that distinguish living beings from artifacts. First, the 
way in which the moments or organs of an organism depend 
on the framework of the whole seems stronger than the way in 
which the parts of an artifact are related to its whole. The 
moments of the self-organizing being not only depend on the 
whole in the sense that they are defined as functional elements 
that can only be specified and identified as functional elements 
with reference to the whole, but in the stronger sense that they 
can only come into existence and subsist within and due to the 
whole: Through their interrelation the moments reciprocally 
produce and sustain themselves.14 Whereas the wheels of the 
watch are only suited to one another and do not produce each 
other, the organs of a living being cause one another recipro-
cally and are only there “because of” and “through” each other 
(KU 5:374). Second, in a self-organizing being the whole is not 
external or transcendent, but immanent to the complex being 
in question. Whereas in the watch the producing cause of the 
watch and its form is not contained in nature but in the mind 
of its creator, in the living being the parts are reciprocally the 
cause and eﬀect of each other and in this way bring about a whole 
that is immanent to them. “In this way alone is it possible in turn 
for the idea of the whole conversely (reciprocally) to determine 
the form and combination of all the parts”—not as a whole 
14 The moments, thus, are not parts that can subsist independently of the interrelation 
of the parts within a whole. An organ detached from the body does not subsist as this 
organ but as an aggregate of matter, merely resembling this former organ.
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given ahead or situated above the actual happenings, but as a 
whole present in the co-production of the parts.15 
For Kant, this immanence of the idea of the whole generates 
our diﬃculties in understanding living organisms: We do not 
possess the capacity for an intuitive understanding that would 
be able to intuit the whole as such (i.e. a concrete and actual 
whole) and that could go “from the synthetically universal (of 
the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from the 
whole to the parts” (KU 5:407). As we have only a discursive 
understanding, our understanding has to start out from an ana-
lytical universal (a concept) so that we cannot begin from a con-
crete and immanent whole but only from the representation of 
the whole (an abstract and merely possible whole, so to speak). 
Thus, we have to conceive of living beings on the model of the 
production of artifacts: in order to grasp their wholeness at all 
we have to treat them as if they began from an abstract repre-
sentation of the whole under which then—in a process of tech-
nical construction—particular elements were subsumed so as 
to form the whole being. In other words, we have to treat them 
as if they were purposively designed, although this seems to fail 
to grasp the actual way in which this purposiveness manifests 
itself.16 
15 That implies that the parts are not only more dependent on the whole than the parts 
of an artifact; they are simultaneously more autonomous: Insofar as they participate in 
producing a whole they are not just a mere part but also co-author of the whole that 
in turn determines them. The parts thereby turn out to be autonomous by way of 
depending on a whole of a peculiar type. — Kant parallelizes this type of immanent 
organization with forms of organization in the political field (KU 5:375)—cf. on this 
point Sally Sedgwick, “The State as Organism: The Metaphysical Basis of Hegel’s Phi-
losophy of Right,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2001), pp. 171–188. For the way 
in which Hegel deepens the Kantian idea and understands the form of social self-
determination in terms of an organic structure that gives autonomy also to its parts, 
see Frederick Neuhouser, The Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000, especially pp. 41–49, 121–144; 204ﬀ.
16 Instead of locating the whole in an idea which is really present in some other 
understanding, one could also try to locate it in an immanent, formative force that 
defines the dynamic inner unity of the organized entity and its capacity to organize 
further matter. Such a force, which Kant in fact mentions (KU 5:374 “formative power”; 
KU 5:422ﬀ.: “formative drive”), can however not be determined independently of the 
Yet no matter how problematic our mode of knowing the 
self-organizing structure of the living being may be, the struc-
ture in itself—which Kant describes quite clearly, despite the 
restrictions of our discursive understanding—is highly relevant 
to the problem with which we began: how to imagine an auton-
omous order, an order that would be under its “own” laws. It is 
precisely as a self-organizing being that immanently produces 
its governing purposive unity—and that does not receive its 
lawfulness from without—that we might say that the living 
being is autonomous and possesses its own laws. Not only are 
the actions or features of the living being to be explained by 
laws of autonomy in the sense that these laws “refer to nothing 
not contained in its own nature.”17 That is to say, the actions and 
features of the living being are not only to be explained by laws 
that are its own in the sense that these laws derive from its own 
organization. These laws are the living beings’ own in the deeper 
sense that they are brought about by this very being: Insofar as 
a living being constitutes and organizes itself, it can be regarded 
as the very source of its form. While we will explain the shape 
and the behavior of an artifact, e.g., a watch, with reference to 
its specific purposive form—the purposive nature of this 
object—it however does not seem felicitous to speak of the 
autonomy of a watch, as this purposive nature is implanted into 
organism, is not e.g. a peculiar quality of a certain matter, but is rather an expression 
for the unexplained holistic property of the organized being. Hence it remains a 
problematic concept in the realm of the natural sciences. For more on Kant’s use of 
Blumenbach’s proto-biological concept of the “formative drive” cf. James L. Larson, 
“Vital Forces: Regulative Principles or Constitutive Agents?,” ISIS 70 (1979), pp. 235–249; 
Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press 1982; P. McLaughlin, “Blumenbach und der Bildungstrieb,” Medizinhistorisches 
Journal 17:4 (1982), pp. 357–372; Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2002, pp. 207ﬀ. In addition, cf. my “Force and 
Form: An Essay on the Dialectics of the Living,” Constellations 18:1 (2010), pp. 21–34.
17 This is Rödl’s formula for autonomy in the fundamental sense: “A law of autonomy 
is the subject’s own law in that it refers to nothing not contained in its own nature.” 
(Rödl, Self-Consciousness, p. 120)
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it from without.18 Insofar as living beings, in contradistinction 
to artifacts, produce themselves, we can indeed say that their 
laws are in a deeper sense their own: living beings produce and 
maintain their own laws, laws which they do not receive from 
a plan or design given from without. In thinking the concept of 
autonomy, it is an essential problem to find a way of imagining 
how the subject can give itself its own law without thereby 
implying an unbound legislator or creator imposing this law. 
The idea of a self-organizing living being can be brought to bear 
on this question by giving us a model of a type of organization 
that is self-constituting. 
Now, one might argue that this self-organization is not really 
pertinent to the question of autonomy as we are here dealing 
with a de facto order: The living being might be self-produced, 
but it does not give itself a law. Kant, however, emphasizes 
(especially in the first introduction to the Critique of Judgment) 
that the self-organization of living things does not merely gen-
erate a de facto order, but rather exhibits an order of normative 
necessity. A living being does not merely exist in this or that 
manner; rather, it tends to suggest “that there is something that 
it ought to be” (EE 20:240).19 Insofar as the living being appears 
18 This distinction of a determination from within and a determination from without 
should not be taken to concern merely the location of the source of the organizing 
principle, but as pointing to a diﬀerence in certain modes of organization: The 
determination from within—the unity of the living being—is peculiar in that it is not 
really adequately represented in an expression detached from it (a plan or an idea in 
an understanding external to it); it is a unity that manifests itself only in the articulated 
living being itself.
19 Kant himself describes this normativity by referring to two forms of purposiveness 
that allow for normative evaluation: first, the relation of the organic being to the con-
cept of this organic being which we treat, hypothetically, as its cause (i.e. the organic 
being as a purpose of nature); second, the suitability of an organ to its function (the 
way in which e.g. the eye fulfills its purpose of seeing). Kant does not elaborate on the 
precise relation of these two instances of purposiveness and, what is more, he does 
not really investigate the specific openness of the normativity of the living that is 
caused by the fact that we cannot identify the purpose of nature independently from 
the organism, the function of the organ independently from the actual doings of the 
organ since we cannot point to any preceding plan or concept in an understanding 
independent from the organic being. There is no separate standard, but only the way 
as a “natural purpose,” it relates to something it ought to be and 
makes room for judgments as to whether the actual creature 
adequately lives up to itself (viz. its species) and hence can be 
called ‘healthy’ or ‘defective.’ Living beings, when considered 
in terms of their inner purposiveness, manifest a sort of ought-
ness that involves a unique form of “necessity,” to be distin-
guished from the “physical-mechanical necessity”: the living 
creature exhibits a normative “necessity of being formed in a 
certain way” (EE 20:240; translation modified). The living crea-
ture manifests a norm, in the form of its species’ inner purpo-
siveness, to which it specifically is subject.20 Living beings thus 
not only bring themselves forth, but are thereby also laws unto 
themselves.21
If we put it in this way, an analogy to an autonomous order 
might become more suggestive than it perhaps seemed at the 
outset. It is however important to note that this analogy only 
holds under a peculiar understanding of the living as self-
organizing. It is not enough to have an organized being—a com-
plex functional unity—or a merely self-maintaining process in 
order to have an analogue of an autonomous order. Autonomy 
is not just being under one’s own law, but being under a law 
that is one’s own in the sense that one is bringing it forth. 
in which the moments of the living being are means and end to each other, recipro-
cally cause and eﬀect of each other, which suggests that there is something that they 
ought to have been. It is this immanence and openness of the normative standard that 
in fact makes the normativity of living beings so interesting with regard to the ques-
tion of autonomy. 
20 For an attempt to ground practical normativity upon the basic form of natural 
normativity characteristic of the living, cf. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2001. For a characterization of the normativity of the living 
which diverges from this idea of normality, cf. Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and 
the Pathological, New York: Zone Books 1998, pp. 115ﬀ.
21 If one contemplates a bit the formulation that living beings are laws unto them-
selves, one will soon become suspicious: It seems questionable to what degree they 
grasp the norms produced in the living process as norms. Another way of saying this: 
they might be laws unto themselves only for us. This is precisely Hegel’s thought in 
stating that living beings in a fundamental way already expose the concept of spirit, 
but only for us, not for themselves. It is only in self-consciousness that this structure 
comes to exist for itself.
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II.
Now, despite the structural parallels between life and auton-
omy on the Kantian picture that I have tried to trace, Kant him-
self has not employed this analogy in any way in order to elu-
cidate the autonomy of practical reason. Although Kant does 
specify the rational will as a “kind of causality of living beings” 
(GMS 4:446; my emphasis), the rational will is autonomous 
only insofar as it precisely does not allow itself to be determined 
by the sensible, living nature of the agent. The subject of an 
autonomous order is for Kant the rational will as such. Hence, 
the only determinations that are capable of conditioning the 
autonomous order are those that are rooted in the nature of the 
rational will itself (and not, for example, in the nature of human 
life). The autonomy of human practical reason paradigmati-
cally manifests itself in the fact that it precisely does not allow 
itself to be guided by its living nature. 
It is an interesting question why exactly this is the case: Is it 
the case because the will, as the will of a rational being as such, 
is essentially distinct from our living existence in nature so that 
our living existence becomes a heteronomous force relative to 
the will? Or is it also the case because a living order is in and of 
itself a heteronomous order, an order not—or not fully—
grounded in itself? At most points Kant doesn’t argue directly 
or explicitly that life is in itself an order that is necessarily het-
eronomous in structure; rather, he argues that it is a source of 
heteronomy with regard to the rational will: The “sensible nature 
of rational beings” as their existence under empirically condi-
tioned laws is, as Kant writes, “for reason heteronomy” (KpV 
5:43; emphasis added). The laws of duty and the laws of life are 
diﬀerent and hence cannot be mixed together without giving 
rise to heteronomy. The “majesty of duty has nothing to do with 
the enjoyment of life, it has its own law and also its own court 
and even though one might want to shake both of them thor-
oughly together, […] they soon separate of themselves.” (KpV 
5:88) This, however, would not necessarily entail that the living 
in and of itself could not said to be autonomous in a basic sense.
On the other hand, it is clear that Kant locates autonomy 
only on one level: the level of practical reason. This suggests 
that he considers the laws of the living as in and of themselves 
laws of heteronomy. Kant’s discussion of what he calls the “com-
parative concept of freedom” (KpV 5:96) might be instructive 
on this point. Kant argues that a comparative conception of 
freedom is insuﬃcient, a mere subterfuge, and it seems that 
Kant is considering here a type of freedom that has some reso-
nances with the idea of freedom as being under “one’s own law.” 
According to a comparative conception of freedom, Kant says, 
a free eﬀect is something “the determining natural ground of 
which lies within the acting being” (KpV 5:96). Comparative 
freedom is thus attributed to such eﬀects that are not externally 
imposed on an entity but that spring from its inner state or 
nature. Kant’s first example is a projectile in free motion, unhin-
dered and unimpelled from without; his second example is the 
motion of a clock that “moves the hands itself” (KpV 5:96) and 
thereby seems to be the source of its own movement and thus 
‘free.’ Kant’s third example is that of the actions of a human 
being which, although necessary by their determining grounds, 
might be regarded as comparatively free, “insofar as the actions 
are caused from within” (KpV 5:96). It thus suggests itself that 
Kant would have to say that for an animal, be it rational or not, 
to be motivated by its living nature would only imply freedom 
in this comparative sense: The determining grounds can be said 
to lie within this animal. But it is irrelevant, so Kant wants to 
suggest, where the source of the determination is to be located: 
“it does not matter whether the causality determined in accor-
dance with a natural law is necessary through determining 
grounds lying within the subject or outside him.” Not the site of 
the source, but the form or mode of determination is decisive. 
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The form or mode of determination that Kant wants to charac-
terize as unfree at this point is the form of causal determination 
in time that he calls that of the “mechanism of nature”: “all 
necessity of events in time in accordance with the natural laws 
of causality can be called the mechanism of nature” (KpV 5:97). 
Whatever springs from our nature according to the mechanism 
of nature in this sense can never be properly called free22 and 
could be regarded as “heteronomous” in structure.
If, as Kant explains in the third Critique, living beings are 
mechanically inexplicable for our discursive understanding, it 
is diﬃcult to determine if this implies as well that they embody 
a form of determination that strictly escapes “the mechanism 
of nature” in the sense that the cited passage from the second 
Critique indicates.23 In any event, Kant tries to characterize our 
22 It is a much-discussed issue whether Kant thinks—and should think—that practi-
cal freedom and autonomy are only possible on the condition of transcendental free-
dom (as the above passage suggests), or if it might be possible to assume that there is 
practical freedom even if we are in fact not transcendentally free (but rather deter-
mined by a higher mechanism of nature). For the latter see especially the following 
passage from the Critique of Pure Reason: “Whether reason is not, in the actions through 
which it prescribes laws, itself again determined by other influences, and whether 
that which, in relation to sensuous impulses, is entitled freedom, may not, in relation 
to higher and more remote operating causes be nature again, is a question which in 
the practical field does not concern us, since we are demanding of reason nothing but 
the rule of conduct, it is a merely speculative question, which we can leave aside so 
long as we are considering what ought or ought not to be done.” (KrV A803/B831)
23 It is a diﬃcult question what exactly Kant refers to when he says in the third Critique 
that organized beings cannot be understood by means of “mechanical explanation.” 
Candidates that have been discussed are (i) that living beings are mechanically inex-
plicable in the sense that they do not allow for an explanation of the whole by means 
of its independent parts (see McLaughlin, Kants Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, 
Bonn: Bouvier 1989; a corresponding passage in Kant is EE 20:236); (ii) that living 
beings seem to contradict a mechanistic explanation in the sense that the powers of 
matter are insuﬃcient to account for the production of organisms (see Ginsborg, “Two 
Kinds of Mechanical Inexplicability”); (iii) that living beings cannot be explained in 
terms of eﬃcient causality (Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2007, pp. 101ﬀ.). The third perspective would imply that 
Kant’s description of living beings’ inner purposiveness indeed is in tension with the 
structure of causal determination explicated in the “Second Analogy” (see Zuckert, 
Kant on Beauty and Biology, p. 136). The idea of a reciprocal determination implied by 
natural purposiveness according to which A is cause and eﬀect of B and thereby in 
some sense both antecedent and subsequent to B, cannot be understood under the 
principle of succession. This might be the strongest reason why Kant thinks we have 
mode of knowledge of living beings in such a way that it does 
not directly contradict the mechanism of nature. And, although 
he describes them as self-organizing, he does not attribute to 
them a spontaneity that is comparable to the full spontaneity 
of a being that can make an unconditioned beginning. Under 
the condition that practical freedom and autonomy are thought 
to presuppose such a transcendental freedom, the way in which 
a living being follows laws that are its own seems to remain 
foreign to the autonomy of the rational will: It lacks the abso-
lute spontaneity of freedom of the intelligible character that is 
unconditioned by the sensible world and only thereby to be 
regarded as the source of autonomy. Insofar as Kant thinks that 
without transcendental freedom “no moral law is possible and 
no imputation in accordance with it,” (KpV 5:97) the formal 
‘autonomy’ of living beings remains useless for him in the eﬀort 
to understand the autonomy of practical reason. 
However, if one does not presuppose transcendental free-
dom as the condition of practical freedom, one can begin to 
reconsider the way in which the formal autonomy of living 
beings might illuminate the autonomy of practical reason. In 
taking up the distinction that Kant indicates between diﬀerent 
sites of the grounds of determination (that are not really decisive 
in questions of freedom) and diﬀerent modes of determination 
(that are of relevance) the question emerges of whether living 
beings, insofar as they are self-organizing beings (and not only 
organized beings), do not indeed embody a specific mode of 
determination characteristic of autonomy as such. Insofar as rea-
son is also to be conceived as a self-organizing entity, as Kant 
suggests when he speaks of an “epigenesis of reason,”24 we 
to conceive of living beings according to the analogy of intentional purposiveness, as 
intentional purposiveness seems in harmony with the principle of succession: the 
whole that is produced by its parts does not as such precede these parts—it is the idea 
or representation of the whole that precedes them.
24 Kant uses this term of the biology of his time in order to characterize pure reason 
as self-constituting and self-organizing: In the B-Deduction he speaks of the system 
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might ask whether the autonomy of practical reason might not 
be informed in one way or another by the mode of determina-
tion found in living beings. In the second half of my paper I 
want to turn to Hegel who seems to pursue precisely this line 
of thought. 
III.
Hegel is clearly following Kant’s lead in characterizing the for-
mal essence of spirit (Geist) as “freedom” and in further deter-
mining this freedom in terms of self-determination (EPG §382). 
“Actual freedom,” for Hegel, is “not something that is immedi-
ately in spirit, but something to be produced by spirit’s activity” 
(EPG §382Z; translation modified). Spirit manifests itself as the 
“producer of its freedom” and its development is to be charac-
terized as a constant activity of “freeing […] itself” (EPG §382Z). 
Thus, for Hegel, to be free in the sense that one is subject to 
one’s own laws is neither to be viewed as something given (as 
something that is just there as a part of the nature of my reason) 
nor is it bound to any single act of legislation. Being subject to 
one’s own laws rather means continuing to produce one’s own 
freedom and constantly becoming what one is. Spirit is ‘auton-
omous’ in the sense that it is a “product of itself” and that “its 
actuality” is “merely that it has made itself into what it is.”25 The 
“concept” (Begriﬀ) for Hegel also gives itself reality in this man-
ner (WL 6:258/587), for it “has actuality […] in such a way that it 
gives this actuality to itself” (PR §1). Hegel thus explicates the 
idea of the autonomy of spirit and the concept in terms of the 
idea of self-production or self-actualization. Autonomy thereby 
of the “epigenesis of pure reason,” in order to indicate that the categories are self-
thought a priori (“selbstgedacht”) and neither derived from experience nor implanted 
in us by our Creator.
25 M. J. Petry (ed.), Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, vol. 1, Dordrecht: Reidel 1978, 
p. 7. The cited passage stems from the notes of Kehler and Griesheim.
moves even closer to the form of self-constitution which defines 
the living according to Kant and Hegel. It is thus no accident or 
slip that Hegel characterizes the living, with reference to animal 
organisms, exactly as he had characterized spirit: a living crea-
ture “only is, in making itself into that which it is” (EN §352; 
translation modified).26 Life and spirit are both characterized 
as entities that produce and constitute themselves by making 
themselves into what they are. Neither exists as a given, but 
only as its own achievement and result. 
The parallel between spirit and life can be seen more clearly 
if we take a brief look at Hegel’s characterization of animal life 
in his Encyclopaedia. Hegel describes animal life as the point in 
nature where subjectivity emerges. That is to say, animals pos-
sess a basic form of subjectivity that prefigures the self-produc-
tive quality of spirit in decisive respects: The animal exists as 
self-production in the sense of the production of a self. The ani-
mal does that by producing its own shape, by endowing its envi-
ronment with a specific form impregnated with the animal’s 
self and by actualizing a general form in its particular being. 
Hegel articulates these three dimensions of self-production as 
(1) the process of shape, (2) the process of assimilation, and (3) the 
genus-process. As the process of shape concerns the self-articu-
lation of the living individual into its parts, which reciprocally 
condition and produce each other, the process of assimilation 
concerns the relation of the living being to its (inorganic) envi-
ronment. The genus-process concerns the interrelation of dif-
ferent individuals of one genus. In this sense the process of 
shape concerns the self-relation of the living, as the process of 
assimilation concerns the relation of the living to its other. The 
genus-process unifies these two relations insofar as it concerns 
the way in which what is living relates to itself in relating to its 
26 See also VPGE 183/109: “Thus, the organic individual produces itself: it makes itself 
into what it is in itself; spirit, too, is simply that into what it makes itself, and it makes 
itself into what it is in itself.” 
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other. These three processes determine the way in which the 
living can be said to be self-constitutive, to make itself into what 
it is and to realize a basic form of freedom: a Being-at-one-with-
oneself-in-the-other.27
(1) Hegel’s descriptions of the process of shape are largely 
indebted to Kant’s concept of the organism as a self-organizing 
entity in which the parts are cause and eﬀect of one another. 
The shape of the organism is alive precisely to the extent that 
it exists as a process: a process of articulation whereby the parts 
(as moments of the whole) and the whole (as produced by its 
parts) are brought forth. The parts of the shape are not inde-
pendent parts, but “moments in a living subjectivity” (EN 
§356Z).28 Hegel explains this process of organization—slightly 
diﬀerent from Kant’s more harmonious picture—as itself 
already a dialectical and tense process comprised of two 
moments: the articulating or producing of an inner self (not 
bound by any single shape) on the one hand and of the con-
crete, sustained external shape on the other hand. The organ-
ism is the “higher repose” as the “unity” of these two moments, 
the “internal and external” (EN §356Z). The dialectical quality 
and the negativity involved become evident in Hegel’s charac-
terization of the process of shaping: It is the process “in which 
the organism converts its own members into a non-organic 
nature, into means, lives on itself and produces its own self, i.e. 
this same totality of articulated members, so that each member 
is reciprocally end and means, maintains itself through the other 
27 Cf. “Freedom is to will something determinate, yet to be with oneself (bei sich) in 
this determinacy and to return once more to the universal.” (PR §7Z) See also: “Spirit 
is here purely at home with itself, and thereby free, for that is just what freedom is: 
being at home with oneself in one’s other, depending on oneself and being one’s own 
determinant.” (EL §24Z2) For the thesis that Hegel’s conception of “Being-at-one-with-
oneself-in-the-other” is deeply connected to his conception of “life,” see Terry Pinkard, 
Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012.
28 In his Science of Logic Hegel expresses this thought by saying that “the organism is 
a manifold, not of parts but of members”(WL 6:476/766).
members and in opposition to them.” (EN §356; emphasis 
added) Hegel thereby reformulates the very type of organiza-
tion that Kant characterized as the form of organized living 
beings.
(2) The second dimension in which Hegel describes this self-
organizing form is its relation to its environment. This is an 
aspect of the self-organizing being upon which Kant had not 
particularly focused and that contributes to an extension of the 
analogy between life and practical subjectivity in Hegel.29 Hegel 
conceives of the animal’s relation to its non-organic environ-
ment as one of assimilation. Assimilation takes on the form of 
a theoretical process, a practical process, and a unity of both 
termed the “ideally real process” (EN §357Z). The theoretical 
assimilation signifies a process whereby a living being takes up 
the environment with its senses and in doing so transforms it 
into something that is formative for itself. Practical assimilation 
describes the way in which the living being employs non-
organic nature in order to get rid of its sensation of lack (either 
by transforming the outer nature into an instrument for doing 
so [formal assimilation] or by consuming and destroying parts 
of the environment to fulfill its needs [real assimilation]). What 
is important in the idea of assimilation is the way in which the 
animal literally transforms its environment into a part of itself 
(by employing or consuming it). It can do so to the extent that 
it has a self-relation in which the environment is already 
implied: the sensation of lack. The fact that the living being is 
in need is a mark of distinction in Hegel’s view. Only a living 
being can feel lack, and this is the precondition for its having 
an assimilative relation to its environment (that means: for not 
being just indiﬀerently opposed to its environment, but in such 
29 The point is however not totally absent from Kant. See his description of growth 
in §64: “This plant first pre-pares the matter that it adds to itself with a quality peculiar 
to its species, which would not be provided by the mechanism of nature outside of it, 
and develops itself further by means of material which, as far as its composition is 
concerned, is its own product.” (KU 5:371)
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a relation to the environment that it is potentially transform-
able into the animal itself ). In the concept of lack the lack’s 
overcoming is already present in such a way that this manner 
of being finite is simultaneously a form of infinitude.30 The 
animal, by being in need, is no longer merely subject to external 
causes, but to “external potencies” and is thus subject to a dif-
ferent mode of being determined: one in which it itself is 
already implied (EN §359).31 That is to say, the laws of the living 
not only specify that living beings of the type N do A, if—acci-
dentally, unforeseeably—an M does B to them, but they specify 
that N’s do A under specific circumstances (“when M’s do B”) 
that N’s are adapted to. The laws of the living comprise the spe-
cific circumstances of the living, since the animal is actual not 
only in the shape of its body but also in the peculiar “shape” 
with which it endows its environment. The basic form in which 
the living being specifies elements of its environment is accord-
ing to Hegel “instinct” (which is, of course, a very rudimentary 
and still limited form of accessing a specific environment). 
By means of assimilation, that is, by becoming able to trans-
form its environment into a part of itself, the animal posits itself 
“as subjectivity, as real being for-self” (EN §365Z). In the forms 
of practical assimilation the subject, however, does so only in a 
limited way by satisfying specific needs (e.g. its hunger or 
thirst). It does not yet “satisfy itself,” (or: its Self ) in the sense of 
gaining a sense of its own selfhood. There is however one form 
of assimilation—that which unifies theoretical and practical 
assimilation—in which the animal even accomplishes this in 
a rudimentary form: in its constructive instinct (“Bildungstrieb,” 
30 “A being which is capable of containing and enduring its own contradiction is a 
subject; this constitutes its infinitude.” (EN §359Z) 
31 The parallel formulation in the Science of Logic is: “In so far as the object confronts 
the living being in the first instance as an indiﬀerent externality, it can act upon it 
mechanically; but in doing so it is not acting on a living being; where it enters into 
relationship with a living being it does not act on it as a cause, but excites it.” (WL 
6:482/771) 
“Kunsttrieb”) it transforms its environment—e.g. by building 
nests, constructing weapons—in such a way that the environ-
ment reflects the animal self: “In the constructive instinct the 
creature has produced itself as an outer existence and yet 
remains the same immediate creature; here, then, it first attains 
to self-enjoyment, to the specific feeling of self.” (EN §365Z)32
(3) The third dimension in which the animal subjectivity is 
characterized is the genus-process: the relation of the individ-
ual animal being to its genus. The genus is the concrete sub-
stance of the singular subject, and a living being is inherently 
related to its genus: it exemplifies, maintains and reproduces 
its genus. But the way in which it does this attests to a decisive 
limit of the living. The genus is only in an “implicit” (“ansich-
seiender”) unity with the singularity of the subject (EN §367). 
In manifesting its genus—through reproduction, in the con-
frontation of diﬀerent species and in illness and natural 
death—the particular living being each time perishes (literally: 
dies). The living being is an outcome and a means or vehicle of 
genus-process, but we do not find a living individual that is in 
and for itself the genus.33 This is the very limit of the living: Its 
inability to be for itself genus and to maintain itself in this rela-
tion. This can only become possible for a being that becomes 
aware of its life as such and that in this sense becomes capable 
of transforming this natural mode of subjectivity. 
While animal life can indeed be regarded as “autonomous” 
in the formal sense with regard to the inner organization 
brought about by the living process itself, and while animals 
32 The animal in this sense already seems to be on the track to the provisional 
‘solution’ of the master-slave problem: Arbeit and Bildung.
33 If it is true that Hegel regards this limited right of the individual as a shortcoming 
of the form of the living, this suggests that he will need to have a diﬀerent notion of 
the status of the individual in the sphere of spirit. Hegel’s description of the living thus 
seems to imply that the realm of a fully actualized freedom of spirit requires a form 
of individual freedom that goes beyond individuals being a mere “‘vehicle’ of cosmic 
spirit.” For a critique of such a view of the individual’s freedom within Sittlichkeit, see 
Neuhouser, The Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, pp. 50ﬀ.
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can be regarded as expressing, through their assimilative activ-
ity, the idealism of the free will that does not take the things “as 
they are, to be in and for themselves”34 but transforms and 
appropriates them, they do not, in the cycle of reproduction, 
manifest the identity of producing and produced that Hegel 
requires of spirit.35 The “animal soul is still not free for […] it is 
only in the form of individuality that the genus is for the ani-
mal. The animal can only sense the genus, it is not aware of it. 
[…] By the sublation of the particularity of the sexes which 
occurs in the genus process the animal does not attain to the 
production of the genus; what is produced by this process is 
again only an individual.” (EPG §381Z) That which is living in 
this sense produces a structure that it cannot fully grasp for 
itself. It is only in a new form of self-conscious vitality that this 
can be accomplished.
IV.
Hegel not only extends the structural parallels of life and spirit 
as self-constituting entities marked by processes of articulation, 
assimilation and reproduction, but also introduces a new form 
of distinguishing and relating life and spirit: Spirit does not 
exist alongside or somewhere beyond living nature; it is instead 
intimately connected to living nature. That however is not to 
say that it is just an extension or an enhancement of living 
nature—instead it displays a thoroughly transformed life of its 
34 PR §44: “The free will is consequently that idealism which does not consider things 
[Dinge], as they are, to be in and for themselves, whereas realism declares them to be 
absolute, even if they are found only in the form of finitude. Even the animal has gone 
beyond this realist philosophy, for it consumes things [Dinge] and thereby proves that 
they are not absolutely self-suﬃcient.” See on this point also Pinkard, Hegel’s 
Naturalism, p. 18f.
35 EPG §379Z: “For whereas […] the seed produced is not identical with the seed that 
produced it, in self-knowing spirit the product is one and the same as that which 
produces it.”
own that is gained from and against natural life. The life of 
spirit is of such a sort that natural life “appears partly as 
opposed to it, partly as posited at one with it” (WL 6:471/762).36 
There are various sites where Hegel deals with the passage 
from merely animal life to self-conscious life. At this point, I 
want to direct attention to just two of those sites which in turn 
imply two related basic characterizations of this transforma-
tion: they characterize it as the transformation of a reflective turn 
(spirit as life knowing itself as such) and that of a redoubling of 
life (spirit as realizing itself in the mode of a second nature). The 
first characterization can be articulated with regard to the pas-
sage in the Phenomenology of Spirit in which consciousness, fac-
ing a living object, grasps itself as self-consciousness; the sec-
ond one can be elaborated by reference to the Anthropology 
chapter in the Encyclopaedia where Hegel describes the living 
nature of the human as the first stage of subjective spirit.37 I will 
not be able to give a full analysis here, but I would like to indi-
cate the type of turn that Hegel is interested in. 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit life appears at a famous “turn-
ing point”: consciousness attains a new level when it grasps its 
object as alive—namely the level of self-consciousness. Hegel 
attempts to show how what is living (as object) lays bare the 
fundamental structure of spirit in the relationship between the 
single organ and the overarching organism, between the exem-
plar and its general species, the separate shape and the univer-
sal fluidity of life. However, the living only manifests this struc-
ture in itself without yet possessing the structure for itself. In its 
36 For more on the sense in which spirit is aware of itself at once as life and as more 
than life see Frederick Neuhouser, “Life, Freedom, and Social Pathology,” in: A. 
Honneth and G. Hindrichs (eds.), Freiheit: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 2011, Frankfurt 
am Main: Klostermann 2013.
37 Further important sites of transition are to be found in Hegel’s Science of Logic 
where the idea of life gives way to the idea of cognition (WL 6:487/775); in the Philosophy 
of Right where Hegel describes a transition from natural to ethical will (PR §§4ﬀ.); and 
in Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics in the discussion of natural and artificial beauty (VA 
13:157ﬀ./1:116ﬀ.).
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result, life points beyond itself “to something other than itself, 
viz. to consciousness, for which Life exists as this unity, or as 
genus” (PhG 3:143/109). The structure of spirit (Geist) presents 
itself to (self-)consciousness in the living, but it does so in a way 
that escapes the living itself. This does not, however, make (self-)
consciousness something altogether diﬀerent in kind, but 
rather—as Hegel explicitly formulates it—“this other Life” for 
which the structure of first life becomes recognizable. (Self-)
Consciousness is, so to speak, a reflexive life, a life that knows 
itself as life.38 This has a twofold implication: (self-)conscious-
ness continues to manifest itself as something living, but as a 
something living whose relation to its own life is transformed, 
because it knows itself to be alive and relates to itself as such. 
The possibility of this self-relation is ultimately conceived as a 
social relation among various living beings (in terms of their 
recognition of one another). This “other Life”—human con-
sciousness—is not then simply an instantiation of its kind, but 
rather a participant in a form of life, a self-conscious subject of 
its practices that possesses a relation both to itself and to the 
manner in which it exemplifies the universal: “this other Life 
[…] for which the genus as such exists and which is the genus for 
itself” is “self-consciousness” (PhG 3:143/109; translation modified). 
Self-consciousness is the reflexively articulated form of a self-
grounded order which manifests itself for this self-conscious-
ness in the living in its most elementary form. The actuality of 
spirit is, in this sense, for Hegel not made possible by rational 
animals existing in another, intelligible world beyond the sen-
sible world. It is rather made possible by their relating and 
accommodating themselves to their own nature, which they 
transform in a social process of experience and enculturation.
38 For more on this “self-application of the concept of life” cf. Axel Honneth, “Von der 
Begierde zur Anerkennung,” in: K. Vieweg and W. Welsch (eds.), Hegels Phänomenolo-
gie des Geistes, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2008, pp. 187–204, here 193.
The way in which this program could be unfolded in articu-
lating how a living self-consciousness might come about, can 
be seen in Hegel’s conception of a “second nature.” Hegel 
describes the emergence of this “second nature” on its most 
basic level in the first part of his Philosophy of Mind, in a section 
called “Anthropology”39 (EPG §§388–412) and returns to this 
concept time and again to specify the mode of being of ethical 
life.40 The Anthropology deals with what Hegel calls “soul” and 
mediates between Hegel’s account of animal life on the one 
hand and his accounts of developed forms of subjective spirit 
on the other. Systematically, this section characterizes the 
slumber and the awakening of spirit in nature and describes 
the very passage, as Hegel explicitly says, “from necessity to 
freedom” (EPG §381Z). This passage is accomplished in the soul 
in some basic respects by means of the “mechanism of habit” 
that establishes a ‘second’ or an ‘artificial’ nature (EPG §410A). 
This mechanism of habit is especially interesting to the extent 
that it has a double aspect: on the one hand, it creates an artifi-
cial, self-produced nature and thereby frees the soul from some 
determinations of its first nature; on the other hand, it does so 
only by using a mechanism and by establishing a second nature. 
The soul cannot attain its freedom by means of an arbitrary act 
39 The far-reaching implications of this section are often overlooked. Recently, how-
ever, the text has been brought to renewed attention by Catherine Malabou, The Future 
of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, London and New York: Routledge 2005, 
Part I: “Hegel on Man: Fashioning a Second Nature,” pp. 21–76. See also: Michael Wolﬀ, 
Das Körper-Seele-Problem: Kommentar zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830), §389, Frankfurt am 
Main: Klostermann 1992, especially pp. 171–187.
40 The general form of habit, articulated in the Anthropology, does not remain 
restricted to primitive forms of spirit’s activity, but on the contrary “is a form that 
embraces all kind’s and stages of mind’s activity” (EPG §410A), from man’s posture 
and his perceptual capacities up to the ethical (“the habit of right”) and thought (EPG 
§410A). For Hegel’s characterization of ethical life in terms of a second nature see 
especially PR §4 (“the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from 
within itself as second nature”) and PR §151 (“the ethical […] appears as custom; and 
the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the original 
and purely natural will and is the all pervading soul, significance, and actuality of 
individual existence”).
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of will, by just abstracting from its first nature. It can attain free-
dom only by transforming its nature, and this means, on the 
elementary level, repeating or redoubling nature. Habit is the 
basic form of such a redoubled nature: “Habit has rightly been 
called a second nature: nature, because it is an immediate being 
of the soul, a second nature, because it is an immediacy posited 
by the soul.” (EPG §410A) In this self-posited immediacy, spirit 
is on the one hand free since it produces the very immediacy it 
displays; yet at the same time it constrains itself insofar as its 
‘legislations’ take on the form of immediate nature for it, man-
ifesting themselves as habits or customs. 
But why does this form of second nature become necessary 
and how does it arise? Hegel describes the situation of the soul 
in such a way that on its way to freedom it faces the danger of 
an internal split, described by Hegel as a derangement or mad-
ness, which can only be overcome by means of habit.41 The soul 
“struggles with the immediacy of its substantial content in 
order to rise to simple subjectivity relating itself to itself” (EPG 
§408Z), and in this struggle the second stage it reaches is one 
of derangement: it is split between the fixed particularity it tries 
to overcome and its subjectivity which is free for itself (EPG 
§408A). Its free subjectivity takes the shape of “a purely formal, 
empty, abstract subjectivity” (EPG §408Z) and thus possesses 
only abstract freedom. In the stage of derangement the soul 
tries to unify its particular determinations and its free subjec-
tivity, but succeeds only in the form of a subjective identity of 
the subjective and the objective. The self identifies itself sub-
jectively with a particular determination and thereby falls short 
of its own generality and of the task of objectively realizing this 
41 With regard to the relation of habit and madness see Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 
pp. 28ﬀ and Zizek’s essay “Discipline between Two Freedoms—Madness and Habit 
in German Idealism,” in M. Gabriel/S. Zizek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Sub-
jectivity in German Idealism, London: Continuum 2009; for an extended version see 
also Zizek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, London: 
Verso 2012, pp. 327–358.
unity. The mad person regards “an empty abstraction and mere 
possibility” as “something concrete and actual” (EPG §408Z). For 
example, the man who takes himself to be king, without objec-
tively being in a position anywhere near to this, does so only 
on the basis of an “indeterminate universal possibility” (EPG 
§408Z): since a man in general can be king, the man in question 
could be one.42 
In this sense madness embodies a first, although unsuccess-
ful attempt at a ‘free’ self-determination—the production of a 
certain unity of the particular determination of the soul and its 
general being as an I. The failure resides in the fact that mad-
ness falls short not only of the objective reality that doesn’t cor-
respond to the mere possibility; it falls short even of the abstract 
freedom of the I itself, as the mad person, in deploying this 
indeterminacy, over-identifies with a particular determination: 
In the attempt to grasp itself in a particular and arbitrary deter-
mination, the deranged agent “forfeits the ability […] to remain 
perfectly present to itself in each of its representations” (EPG 
§408Z). 
Now, habit is supposed to oﬀer a diﬀerent attempt at attaining 
self-determination. It oﬀers a way for the soul to determine itself 
and nevertheless sustain its generality in this determination. It 
avoids both failures of madness: (i) it does not confine itself to a 
merely subjective identity of the subjective and the objective, 
but instead strives to realize such a unity objectively (it trans-
42 That the self is at all capable of fixing itself to such an abstract possibility finds its 
basis in the fact that the I as such is a “wholly abstract, completely indeterminate I, an 
I thus standing open to any content whatever” (EPG §408Z). This abstract I indeed 
marks a genuine capacity of the mind to make itself indeterminate. Cf. PR §5, in which 
a certain aspect of the will is defined, namely “this absolute possibility of abstracting 
from every determination in which I find myself or which I have posited in myself, 
the flight from every content as a limitation.” The fact that madness draws from this 
capacity turns it into a “privilege” of man EPG §408Z: “Only man gets as far as grasp-
ing himself in this complete abstraction of the I. This is why he has, so to speak, the 
privilege of folly and madness.”
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forms the objective body).43 (ii) Secondly, it establishes a genuine 
mediation of the particular and the general, the singular being 
and its genus. In habit, the soul transforms particular determi-
nations in such a way that they are situated in its general dispo-
sitions and capacities, and it articulates its generality in such a 
way that it takes on a particular shape (in the guise of specific 
habits). As concrete acts and sensations are transformed by 
means of repetition and practice into acts instantiating and 
articulating a general disposition that outlives the mere actu-
alities, the soul realizes itself as a concrete and specifically artic-
ulated general being. Habit supersedes the mere collapsing of 
the general and the particular and enters the work of mediation, 
which allows one to relate to a “universal mode of action which 
constitutes one’s individuality” (EPG §410Z).
The prime variants of habit in which this happens are (i) the 
hardening against external sensations and distress, (ii) a dulling 
of desires by the habit of their satisfaction and (iii) the estab-
lishment of dexterity. In the hardening against sensations and 
the dulling of desires, the soul gains distance and liberty from 
particular, external determinations and determinations of its 
first nature, whereas in the establishing of dexterity it trans-
forms itself (its body) “into an instrument” (EPG §410A) for its 
own particular actions and determinations: it incorporates pur-
posiveness into the body. The establishment of dexterity is 
described in a way analogous to the living process of the articulation 
of shape: the living being turns its parts into means and thereby 
constitutes them as moments of a purposive whole. The mech-
anism of habit repeats this type of articulation in a ‘free’ mode. 
Hegel generally understands this process in such a way that by 
means of habit the soul “has made itself so at home in the con-
tent, that it moves about in it with freedom” (EPG §410Z). By 
43 Hegel’s concept of habit in this sense is not identical with the notion of custom 
that he attributes to Hume and criticizes harshly. Habit in Hume, it seems to Hegel, 
is thought as a merely subjective necessity—see VGP 20:278ﬀ./3:372ﬀ.
means of repetition and practice a form of concrete generality 
is engendered over time in such a way that an accidental par-
ticular determination becomes essential, whereas the essential 
is determined as acquired and thus contingent.44 By means of 
habit the accidental and the essential intersect in order to con-
stitute a certain form of contingent necessity, characteristic of the 
posited immediacy of second nature: they constitute a ‘neces-
sity’ (EPG §410Z) and ‘naturalness’ (EPG §410A) that is distinct 
from the type of external necessity characteristic of inanimate 
nature. 
Due to the process of habituation, the particular determina-
tions do not appear as merely contingent individual sensations 
anymore, but as articulations of one’s own self. Habit in this way 
becomes a primitive articulation of freedom in the Hegelian 
sense of “being at one with oneself in the other.” In its habitual 
activity the subject relates in its acts and sensations to itself, 
insofar as the determinations that are appropriated by means 
of habit formation are not merely external but exist as posited 
by the activities of the subject. Habit is, in this sense, not just a 
mechanism of determination, but a basic form of self-determi-
nation. Habit enables the soul to take possession of its deter-
minations and to be with itself in these determinations. That 
the soul is with itself in its determinations however does not 
mean that the soul is just identical to its determinations or com-
pletely immersed in them. Habit has the remarkable feature 
that the soul is with itself in its determinations without being 
fully absorbed by these determinations. The soul has reduced 
these determinations to features of its own being: it has reduced 
them to something that belongs to its very being, without how-
ever exhausting it.45 Thus Hegel understands habit as a means 
44 For more on this “becoming essential of the accident” and a “becoming accidental 
of essence,” see Malabou, The Future of Hegel, p. 160.
45 “In habit man […] is free in so far as the natural determinacy of sensation is by habit 
reduced to his mere being.” (EPG §410)
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of possessing one’s determinations that implies neither that the 
soul stands in relationship with them as distinguishing itself 
from them, nor is absorbed in them, but has them and moves in 
them: is with itself in the other.
It is precisely the need to take into account this basic form 
of freedom and the correlative diﬀerent sense of necessity—a 
‘free,’ a ‘self-constituted’ necessity—that gives habit such a par-
adigmatic status for Hegel. In habit the soul not only estab-
lishes its second nature and new forms of mechanical necessity, 
it simultaneously establishes a new relation to this necessity. This 
is why this repetition or redoubling of nature is relevant to the 
passage from merely animal to a self-conscious life: An orga-
nization instituted and formed by habit opens up the possibil-
ity of a reflexive grasp of this form of organization. Remarkably 
enough, it is precisely the ambiguous mechanical character of 
habit that allows for the establishment of this self-relation: The 
habitual necessities establish such an automatic character that 
the soul is not totally occupied with them, but co-exists with 
and relates to them. The soul is in a sense detached from or 
“free” of the particular determinations it is accustomed to 
because by the very habituation and appropriation of them the 
soul reaches a state in which it is not “interested in or occupied 
with them”: “while it exists in these forms as its possessions, it 
is at the same time open to other activity and occupations.” 
(EPG §410) If sensations or activities become habitual, they 
become a necessity that at the same time does not absorb and 
put the subject into bondage: in a given habit consciousness is 
simultaneously “present” and “absent,” “interested” and “indiﬀer-
ent”—it “just as much appropriates the matter-in-hand as, on 
the contrary, it withdraws from it” (EPG §410Z). In realizing 
them, the soul detaches itself from these actual expressions, 
these real possibilities, and keeps something in reserve. This 
detachment has a peculiar character because it does not occur 
as an explicit stepping back from an inclination, a process of 
distancing oneself from a tendency by means of an act of reflec-
tive deliberation. As Hegel points out explicitly, the soul does 
not stand in a relationship with its determinations “as distin-
guishing itself from them.” The detachment or reserve mani-
fests itself in the soul, not by placing its determinations before 
and opposite to itself to evaluate them, but rather in the subtle 
form of the soul’s not fully coinciding with these determina-
tions, but instead having or moving in these determinations. As 
the soul is not dealing with something other—an opposed 
object—in these determinations but with itself, it thereby 
establishes and maintains a diﬀerence from itself. Only insofar 
as habit includes this detachment, this self-relation of the soul, 
can it avoid the failures of the deranged soul that completely 
identifies itself with a particular determination and thereby 
manifests its freedom only arbitrarily. Habit is a liberating form 
insofar as it sets the soul free to detach itself from the necessi-
ties it has become. On Hegel’s account, this is, however, a pre-
carious achievement that is always in imminent danger of being 
lost. The ruse of habit—the fact that it manages to establish the 
realm of spirit by taking on the form of nature and mechanism 
and turning it against the determinations of first nature—can 
reveal itself as the curse of habit: To the extent that habit 
becomes mechanical through and through and absorbs the 
whole soul, it can end up establishing spirit only at the cost of 
turning spirit into nature again. Hegel underlines this deep 
ambiguity of habit explicitly: “[A]lthough, on the one hand, by 
habit a man becomes free, yet, on the other hand, habit makes 
him its slave.” (EPG §410Z)
The danger that habit might absorb the whole soul and thus 
eliminate the peculiar detached self-relation it enabled in the 
first place is especially highlighted by the way in which habit 
can become deadening. Pointing to this danger, Hegel says that 
the habit of living “brings on death,” or to be more precise: that 
the habit of living if it becomes totally abstract “is death itself” 
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(EPG §410A; emphasis added).46 Hegel adds in further remarks 
that by means of the “completed cultivation of [an] activity, the 
vitality of the activity expires” and man becomes old man (EPG 
§396Z), and that one only remains active in so far as one “has 
not yet attained something,” so that all activity can become 
blunt if one totally “habituates to life” (PR §151Z). Against this 
backdrop, it seems that we are facing the task of a constant pro-
cess of acquiring and challenging, learning and unlearning our 
habits in order to maintain a self-relation through this mecha-
nism of habit. It is in this self-relation, that of forming and actu-
alizing a determination and the withdrawal from the actuality 
of the activity enabled by habit, that spirit is liberated. It is lib-
erated by constraining itself and at the same time gaining dis-
tance towards its own constraints. This is the case not only for 
the soul and the basic habits it develops, but also on a diﬀerent 
level for our ethical life that realizes itself in the mode of a sec-
ond nature: “the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit 
produced from within itself as a second nature,” the practices, 
customs, and forms of life that are the embodiment of our self-
determination.47 
Without entering the discussion of this more developed level 
of habituation at this point, it is already obvious that Hegel tries 
46 The German text reads: “[E]s ist die Gewohnheit des Lebens, welche den Tod 
herbeiführt oder, wenn ganz abstrakt, der Tod selbst ist.” (EPG §410) See also VPG 
46f./160f.
47 A full account of Hegel’s theory of freedom as self-determination would need to 
turn to the complex structure of this ethical life—this “realm of actualized freedom.” 
The articulation of the complex inner structure of this realm is, however, beyond the 
scope of this paper. Such an articulation would require: (i) an account of the systematic 
relation of Hegel’s descriptions of the subject as living individual, person, moral 
subject and participant of ethical life; (ii) an account of the inner complexity of the 
institutions of ethical life (family, civil society and the state) and (iii) the interrelations 
between individual and social freedom realized in these institutions and their 
interrelations. For far-reaching elaborations on these points see Axel Honneth, Das 
Recht der Freiheit: Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2011; 
Neuhouser, The Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory; Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 
Part III. The special task for my own account of the structure of ethical life concerns 
the way in which the mode of self-production and self-organization of the living can 
be illuminating with regard to the diﬀerent levels of the actualized realm of freedom.
to develop a peculiar and original concept of second nature that 
gives us an idea of the extent to which nature and spirit are both 
continuous and discontinuous and that makes intelligible that 
spirit opposes itself to life and yet poses itself as at one with it. 
In contemporary discussions, the category of “second nature” 
typically comes up as an idea that is supposed to explain how 
normative orders might become eﬀective and that shall help to 
dissolve the appearance that normative orders are constantly 
vulnerable to challenge. And indeed, in Hegel too the notions 
of habit and custom come up as remedies against a form of 
abstract and arbitrary freedom that fails to transform nature 
consistently (be it the freedom of derangement in the self-feel-
ing soul or the abstract freedom of the will that might lead to a 
“fury of destruction”). However, the capacity to re-naturalize 
the artificial order we establish in transforming our first nature 
is only one side of the coin. The other side is the detachment 
that the subject gains and maintains towards its nature if it is a 
self-posited and second nature.
The way the reference to second nature is employed in con-
temporary discussions not only runs the risk that the qualifica-
tion (second nature) may be underestimated, it also faces the 
danger that the naturalness of this nature may be reduced to 
immediate givenness and unquestionability.48 However, against 
the background of the self-groundedness of the vital order that 
I have tried to stress in my reading of Kant and Hegel, both (i) 
the naturalness and (ii) the secondariness of this form of nature 
can take on a deeper meaning. Second nature is (i) natural not 
48 For this danger compare e.g. Gadamer’s gloss on the second nature of hexis: “By 
hexis is meant not a capacity for this or that, like knowing and understanding are, but 
instead a mode of being like nature [eine Seinsverfassung wie die Natur], a ‘thus and not 
otherwise.’” (Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Possibility of a Philosophical Ethics,” in: 
The Gadamer Reader, ed. Richard E. Palmer, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press 2007, p. 286; translation modified) — For a critique of currently dominant 
conceptions of second nature, focusing on John McDowell, see Robert Pippin 
“Leaving Nature Behind” and his “Postscript” in: The Persistence of Subjectivity, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2005, pp. 186–220.
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only in the sense of its immediate givenness, but also in virtue 
of its open productivity: the inner purposiveness produced in 
second nature is not the consequence of some antecedent given 
idea, but is rather a vital formative process. Second nature is a 
variant of living nature, not a variant of non-living nature. (ii) 
Second nature is a second nature not only because it represents 
a posited immediacy, but in the deeper sense that those who are 
subject to this second nature stand in a detached relation to it. 
A minded creature does not merely fall under its respective 
form of life; it has a relationship to its form of life and to its 
membership in that form of life. It is only this relation, this dif-
ference between a form of life and its participant members, that 
prevents second nature from becoming merely mechanical. A 
second nature only remains ‘lively’ as long as it can be held 
open in the process of formation and reformation.
Against the background of the structural parallels between 
autonomy and life, it thus becomes clear that Hegel’s concept 
of second nature implies a form of productivity (comparable to 
self-organizing living beings) and a socially articulated reflexiv-
ity (not reducible to the model of living beings). Only when we 
understand second nature in this manner does it become clear 
why Hegel tends towards the view that there is simultaneously 
a continuity and a discontinuity between life and spirit, natu-
ralness and mindedness:49 they are continuous insofar as spirit 
must also bring itself forth without being able to simply receive 
its form and laws as antecedently given or given from the out-
side; they are discontinuous insofar as spirit develops a relation 
to itself, which it can generate only as a complex social struc-
49 Cf. here Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, pp. 36–64, esp. p. 42. On the diﬀerence 
between a phenomenological perspective (which tends towards overcoming) and a 
genealogical perspective (which emphasizes the insistence of life), cf. Christoph 
Menke, “Spirit and Life: Towards a Genealogical Critique of Phenomenology,” 
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 27:2 (2006), pp. 159–186; see also Christoph Menke, 
“Autonomie und Befreiung,” in: Khurana and Menke (eds.), Paradoxien der Autonomie, 
pp. 149–184.
ture. It is precisely this self-relation which preserves a quality 
of the vital order that tends to be utterly forgotten in usual con-
cepts of second nature: the specific liveliness of this order.
THOMAS KHURANA (ED.)
THE FREEDOM OF LIFE
HEGELIAN PERSPECTIVES
Freiheit und Gesetz III
With contributions by Matthias Haase, Thomas Khurana, 
James Kreines, Catherine Malabou, Karen Ng, Sally Sedgwick
August Verlag
Abbreviations 7
The Freedom of Life: An Introduction 11
Thomas Khurana
Life, Self-Consciousness, Negativity: 
Understanding Hegel’s Speculative Identity Thesis 33
Karen Ng
Life and Mind 69
Matthias Haase
Kant and Hegel on Teleology and Life 
from the Perspective of Debates about Free Will 111
James Kreines
Life and Autonomy: 
Forms of Self-Determination in Kant and Hegel 155
Thomas Khurana 
Negativity, Life, and the Body: 
Some Reflections on Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage” 195
Catherine Malabou
On Becoming Ethical: 
The Emergence of Freedom in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 209
Sally Sedgwick 
Notes on the Contributors 229
CONTENTSThe book series “Freiheit und Gesetz” is dedicated to an idea that lies at the foundation of modern practical philosophy: the notion that being free and being 
obligated by norms (“the law”) do not stand in opposition to one another but 
instead bear on each other in an essential relation. This is the very idea of 
autonomy: laws are binding only to the extent that we have given them to 
ourselves. The series is devoted to the critical examination of this concept. It 
investigates the complexities and tensions presented by the idea of autonomy, 
the conditions upon which it is based, and the possible consequences of its 
political, juridical, and social realization.
This volume was developed in the context of the Research Cluster The 
Formation of Normative Orders and is published with the support of funds 
made available to the Cluster by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
7ABBREVIATIONS
Works by Hegel
All references to Hegel’s writings in this volume will use the abbreviations listed below. 
The abbreviations will be followed first by the page or section number of a German 
edition (in most cases the Theorie-Werkausgabe edited by Eva Moldenhauer und Karl 
Markus Michel) and secondly, if it diﬀers, by the page or section number of an English 
translation. The authors in this volume have sometimes altered the cited English 
translations where they regarded it necessary. The referenced texts and editions are 
the following: 
Diﬀerenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie, in: G. W. F. 
Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, vol. 2, ed. E. Mold-
enhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970 (cited by vol-
ume and page number) / The Diﬀerence Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System 
of Philosophy, trans., ed. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany: SUNY Press 1977 
(cited by page number).
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830): Erster Teil. 
Die Wissenschaft der Logik mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, vol. 8 of Werke in zwan-
zig Bänden / The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosoph-
ical Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Har-
ris, Indianapolis: Hackett 1991 (cited by section number).
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830): Zweiter Teil. 
Die Naturphilosophie mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, vol. 9 of Werke in zwanzig 
Bänden / Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences (1830), trans. A. V. Miller, with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1970 (cited by section number).
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830): Dritter Teil. 
Die Philosophie des Geistes mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, vol. 10 of Werke in zwan-
zig Bänden / Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Translated from the 1830 Edition, together 
with the Zusätze, trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, rev. M. J. Inwood, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2007 (cited by section number). 
Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal, in: vol. 1 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (cited 
by volume and page number) / The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, in: Early Theo-
logical Writings, trans. T. M. Knox, with an introduction, and fragments trans. 
Richard Kroner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948 (cited by page number).
Glauben und Wissen, in: vol. 2 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (cited by volume and 
page number) / Faith and Knowledge, trans., ed. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris, 
Albany: SUNY Press 1977 (cited by page number).
Phänomenologie des Geistes, vol. 3 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (cited by volume 
and page number) / Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, with foreword 










Texte zur philosophischen Propädeutik, in: vol. 4 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (cited 
by volume and page number) / The Philosophical Propaedeutic, ed. M. George and 
A. Vincent, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Blackwell 1986 (cited by page number). 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im 
Grundrisse. Mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen und den mündlichen Zusätzen, vol. 
7 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden / Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. W. 
Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991 (cited 
by section number).
“Systemfragment von 1800,” in: vol. 1 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (cited by vol-
ume and page number) / “Fragment of a System,” in: Early Theological Writings, 
trans. T. M. Knox, with an introduction, and fragments trans. Richard Kroner, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948 (cited by page number).
Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, vols. 13–15 of Werke in 20 Bänden (cited by volume 
and page number) / Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1975, 3 vols. (cited by volume and page number).
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 18–20 of Werke in zwanzig 
Bänden (cited by volume and page number) / Lectures on the History of Philoso-
phy, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press 1995, 3 vols. (cited by volume and page number).
Vorlesungen über die Logik (Berlin 1831), nachgeschrieben von Karl Hegel, ed. U. 
Rameil and H.-Ch. Lucas, vol. 10 of Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und 
Manuskripte, Hamburg: Meiner 2001 (cited by page number). 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (Berlin 1822/1823), ed. K.-H. 
Ilting, K. Brehmer and H. N. Seelman, in: vol. 12 of Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte 
Nachschriften und Manuskripte, Hamburg: Meiner 1996 (cited by page number) 
/ Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, vol. 1: Manuscripts of the Introduc-
tion and the Lectures of 1822–1823, eds. and trans. R. F. Brown and P. C. Hodgson, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011 (cited by page number).
Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Einleitung 1830/31, in: vol. 18 of Gesammelte Werke, 
ed. Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg: Meiner 1995 (cited by page number) / Introduc-
tion 1830–1, in: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, vol. 1: Manuscripts of 
the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–1823, eds. and trans. R. F. Brown and P. 
C. Hodgson, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011 (cited by page number).
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 16–17 of Werke in zwanzig 
Bänden (cited by volume and page number) / Lectures on the Philosophy of Reli-
gion, trans. Rev. E. B. Speirs, B. D. and J. Burdon Sanderson, New York: Human-
ities Press 1895, 3 vols. (cited by volume and page number).
Wissenschaft der Logik, vols. 5–6 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (cited by volume 
and page number) / Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller, Amherst: Humanity 
Books 1969 (cited by page number).
De Anima, Books II and III, trans. D. W. Hamlyn, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1993.
Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft, in: Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed. 
Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 20, ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Ber-
lin: de Gruyter 1942 / First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
in: I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews, 
ed. P. Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000 (cited by volume 
and page number of the German edition). 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in: vol. 4 of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften / 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans., ed. M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1997 (cited by volume and page number of the German 
edition). 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in: vol. 5 of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften / Critique 
of Practical Reason, trans., ed. M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1997 (cited by volume and page number of the German edition).
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in: vol. 3 of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften / Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans., ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1998 (cited according to the pagination of the first two editions, A (1781) 
and B (1787)).
Kritik der Urteilskraft, in: vol. 5 of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften / Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews, ed. P. Guyer, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2000 (cited by volume and page number of the 
German edition). 
PP:
PR:
SF:
VA:
VGP:
VL:
VPG:
VPGE:
VPR:
WL:
Works by Aristotle
DA:
Works by Kant
EE:
GMS:
KpV:
KrV:
KU:
